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Background: In the United States (US), Medical Examiners and Coroners (ME/Cs) have the legal authority for the
management of mass fatality incidents (MFI). Yet, preparedness and operational capabilities in this sector remain
largely unknown. The purpose of this study was twofold; first, to identify appropriate measures of preparedness,
and second, to assess preparedness levels and factors significantly associated with preparedness.
Methods: Three separate checklists were developed to measure different aspects of preparedness: MFI Plan
Elements, Operational Capabilities, and Pre-existing Resource Networks. Using a cross-sectional study design, data
on these and other variables of interest were collected in 2014 from a national convenience sample of ME/C using
an internet-based, anonymous survey. Preparedness levels were determined and compared across Federal Regions
and in relation to the number of Presidential Disaster Declarations, also by Federal Region. Bivariate logistic and
multivariable models estimated the associations between organizational characteristics and relative preparedness.
Results: A large proportion (42%) of respondents reported that less than 25 additional fatalities over a 48-hour
period would exceed their response capacities. The preparedness constructs measured three related, yet distinct,
aspects of preparedness, with scores highly variable and generally suboptimal. Median scores for the three
preparedness measures also varied across Federal Regions and as compared to the number of Presidential Declared
Disasters, also by Federal Region. Capacity was especially limited for activating missing persons call centers, launching
public communications, especially via social media, and identifying temporary interment sites. The provision of staff
training was the only factor studied that was significantly (positively) associated (p < .05) with all three preparedness
measures. Although ME/Cs ranked local partners, such as Offices of Emergency Management, first responders, and
funeral homes, as the most important sources of assistance, a sizeable proportion (72%) expected federal assistance.
Conclusions: The three measures of MFI preparedness allowed for a broad and comprehensive assessment of
preparedness. In the future, these measures can serve as useful benchmarks or criteria for assessing ME/Cs
preparedness. The study findings suggest multiple opportunities for improvement, including the development and
implementation of national strategies to ensure uniform standards for MFI management across all jurisdictions.
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History is replete with examples of disasters resulting in
catastrophic numbers of fatalities. Just in the last decade,
a wide range of natural and anthropogenic global events
resulted in extremely high mortality rates in the affected
communities. Examples include the 2001 World Trade
Center attacks (~3,000 deaths), the 2003 Western Europe
heat wave (~35,000 deaths), the 2004 South Asian tsunami
(~220,000-230,000 deaths), the 2005 Kashmir earthquake
(~75,000 deaths), 2008 Sichuan, China earthquake
(~87,000), the 2009-10 H1N1 pandemic (~20,000 deaths),
the 2010 Haiti earthquake (~200,000 deaths), the 2011
Japan mega-disaster (~22,000 deaths), and the recent 2014
West Africa Ebola virus disease epidemic (~6,400 deaths)
[1-3]. In some cases, these massive fatality incidents com-
pletely overwhelmed local and even national capacity to
respond appropriately, resulting in both acute and long-
term adverse impacts on survivors and communities [4-6].
Although they are difficult to prepare for, the well-
documented association between ineffective mass fatality
management and adverse impacts on survivors and com-
munities is leading to an increased focus on management
of mass fatality incidents; the United States (US), in par-
ticular, has recognized this as a high priority of disaster
planning [7].
Both large-scale fatality disasters, as well as smaller
scale incidents with multiple fatalities are referred to as
“mass fatality incidents” (MFI). Generally, we use the
term MFI to describe situations in which the resultant
number of deaths exceeds the local jurisdiction’s ability
to respond effectively. More recently, another term, re-
ferred to as “Complex Fatality Management” (CFM), is
being used in recognition of the fact that local capacity
can be overwhelmed by even a single fatality if the inci-
dent involves hazardous chemical, biological, radio-
logical, nuclear or explosive (CBRNE) agents. (Personal
communication, Cynthia Galvin, 2014).
In the US, the medico-legal authority for decedents is
typically under the purview of Medical Examiners or Coro-
ners (ME/Cs). In most jurisdictions (usually county-level),
ME/Cs are responsible for the investigation and manage-
ment of deaths resulting from homicide, suicide, and acci-
dents as well as deaths resulting from incidents that may
present a threat to public health [8]. Offices of ME/C,
spread across over 1000 jurisdictions in the US, can range
from very small offices, essentially manned by one-person,
to much larger and robust offices, with more than one hun-
dred employees [9]. Guidance on MFI management is gen-
erally provided in a state’s mass fatality response plan,
which many states have, usually as an annex to the state’s
disaster plan [10]. The local ME/C may also have office-
specific MFI plans. Although having a written plan is an
important first step, ME/Cs must also have adequate oper-
ational capabilities to execute the plan. Pre-existingrelationships with response partners, including governmen-
tal agencies, local businesses, and voluntary organizations,
can be vital to ensuring ME/Cs offices’ response capacity.
These partners may supply additional staff, space, supplies,
or other forms of support.
In response to MFI, the ME/C must execute or over-
see an array of operational tasks. Some of these include:
securing and preserving human remains at a disaster
site; recovering human remains; developing and imple-
menting public communication messages; credentialing
and managing volunteer staff; mobilizing missing per-
sons call centers; performing all morgue operations, includ-
ing ante-mortem and postmortem data collection for
victim identification (Victim Identification Program); trans-
porting, storing and securing temporary interment of re-
mains; and releasing human remains for final disposition
[11-15]. Furthermore, if CBRNE agents have contaminated
the scene and/or human remains, then the ME/C must also
take special precautions to ensure the safety of their staff
and community. ME/Cs must also consider the impact of
their investigative actions with respect to religious rituals or
faith traditions. ME/Cs should also be cognizant of and
make preparations for reducing adverse mental health im-
pacts of the MFI response on staff and volunteers.
In the US, a mechanism exists for local jurisdictions to
request disaster assistance, described in the National Re-
sponse Framework (NRF), the nation’s guide for respond-
ing to all-hazards disasters [7]. Under this framework, the
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) is re-
sponsible for coordinating MFI needs [16], and upon re-
quest, one of the important assets that DHHS can deploy
are the services of Disaster Mortuary Operational Re-
sponse Teams (DMORT). These highly qualified and
skilled teams can bring supplies and expertise to MFI to
help augment local capacity. However, even when
DMORT teams are deployed, ME/Cs are responsible for
the initial MFI management and for requesting this aid
[17]. Because of the complexity of mass fatality manage-
ment operations, there is a growing concern among ME/
Cs regarding preparedness for MFI and their ability to
manage MFI competently, especially for an incident that
involves CBRNE [14].
These types of concerns were formally raised nearly a
decade ago when a panel of national experts was con-
vened by the US Northern Command, which provides
command and control of the Department of Defense
homeland defense efforts. The panel, referred to as the
Joint Task Force Civil Support Mass Fatality Working
Group (“Working Group”), was charged with examining
the available data to determine the response capabilities
and preparedness of the US mass fatality infrastructure
for managing high fatality events, such as pandemics
[12]. The Working Group identified several key elements
of preparedness for the management of mass deaths and
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extent to which these elements had been adopted. The
Working Group concluded that knowledge regarding the
nation’s ability to manage a mass fatality event was lim-
ited. Since that time, many different initiatives have been
undertaken to help ensure the nation’s readiness to man-
age MFI, and most currently, in 2014, a high level Mass
Fatality Management Executive Steering Committee was
formed to help provide effective guidance on MFI pre-
paredness and management (Personal communication,
Cynthia Galvin, 2014).
Since ME/Cs arguably have the most critical role to
play in the US mass fatality infrastructure, and because
preparedness and response capabilities for this group
have not, to our knowledge, been previously assessed
across the nation, the purpose of this study was as follows:
first, to develop criteria for measuring preparedness in this
sector; second, to assess subjective and objective prepared-
ness and operational capabilities; and third, to identify
organizational characteristics and other correlates of
preparedness. This information is valuable in develop-
ing mass fatality management benchmarks as well as
serving as an indicator for assessing actual prepared-
ness. The ultimate goal of this study was to improve
nation-wide MFI capabilities.
Methods
Study design and participants
This cross-sectional study was conducted over a six-week
period in 2014. A self-administered, anonymous survey was
made available on a SSL-secured site using a web-based tool
[18]. Participants were adult professionals in the Medical
Examiner/Coroner field and were recruited through news-
letters, websites, and mass emails with the assistance and
support of professional ME/Cs organizations. All study pro-
cedures involving human participants had prior review and
approval of the University of California, San Francisco
(UCSF) Human Research Protection Program, Committee
on Human Research (CHR) (approval number 12-09425)
and Columbia University Human Research Protection Office
Institutional Review Boards (approval number AAAL0206),
and informed electronically signed consent was obtained
from each participant enrolled in this study.
Questionnaire development and design
The preparedness measures were developed through an
exhaustive four-part process involving the assessment of
existing materials and review by experts in mass fatality
management and emergency preparedness and response.
As a starting point for the measures, national docu-
ments, such as the 2014 National Response Framework
[7] and the National Response Plan (NRP) [19], and in
particular, the NRF Emergency Support Function #8, the
Public Health and Medical Services Annex [16], werecarefully reviewed. A core functional area under ESF #8,
is “mass fatality management, victim identification, and
decontamination of remains,” for which the Department
of Health and Human Services has primary and coordin-
ating responsibility. The delineation of the supplemental
role of the federal government was necessary for com-
parison and clarity of the ME/C responsibilities all juris-
dictional level [5]. The second step in developing the
measures was to conduct an environmental scan of
existing state annexes or mass fatality plans as well as
other available documents on mass fatality planning and
response from the National Association of Medical Ex-
aminers (NAME) and the International Association of
Coroners and Medical Examiners, the two leading pro-
fessional associations for ME/C [15,20-26]. Additionally,
at this stage, we also reviewed toolkits and checklists de-
veloped by several state mass fatality planners, and we
also reviewed the British Columbia Coroners Service
(BCCS) Mass Fatality Response Plan [27-29]. These key
documents provided the reference point for developing
the preparedness measures, which were conceptualized
as consisting of three domains: (1) Mass Fatality Plan
Elements; (2) Mass Fatality Response Operational Cap-
abilities, and (3) Pre-existing Resource Networks. In the
third step, draft items for each of the measures of pre-
paredness were then prepared and submitted for review
and assessment to more than a dozen nationally recog-
nized subject experts and key informants. These in-
cluded the lead authors of highly developed state and
regional plans, members of the national mass fatality
planning steering committee, leadership of national pro-
fessional ME/C organizations, and emergency manage-
ment and mass fatality planning leaders. Our goal was to
obtain consensus on the content validity of these new
measures. In the fourth and final step, 11 representatives
of the target population (ME/Cs) were asked to pre-test
the computerized version of these measures and other ele-
ments of the questionnaire so that we could assess face
validity of the measures as well as readability and length of
time for completion. A copy of the ME/C questionnaire
and codebook are appended in an Additional files 1 and 2,
and all other documents related to the development of the
measures may be obtained by contacting the correspond-
ing author. The study questionnaire was written in English
and prepared at a 13.5 grade reading level for ease of com-
pletion (length of time to complete ranged from 12-20 mi-
nutes) [30]. Most items used “yes”, “no”, “don’t know”
response categories or discreet categorical responses. The
three preparedness measures used a simple checklist box
to indicate a positive (“yes”) response. The questionnaire
included items that addressed organizational characteris-
tics, MFI preparedness measures, and staff ability and will-
ingness to report to duty, which is conceptualized as an
important outcome related to preparedness [31-34].
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Organizational characteristics
Seven items were used to characterize the respondent’s
organization, including office type (Medical Examiner vs
Coroner or other), location (zip code), population size of
jurisdiction served, whether urban or rural setting, num-
ber of employees, number of additional fatalities in ex-
cess of normal case load within a 48-hour period that
would exceed capacity, and MFI experience in the past
5 years.
Mass Fatality Incident (MFI) preparedness
MFI Preparedness was assessed by three new categorical
(nominal) measures: (a) Mass Fatality Plan Elements, op-
erationalized as a 19-item checklist derived primarily
from sample state mass fatality plans and the National
Association of Medical Examiners (NAME) MFI manage-
ment procedures [35]; (b) Mass Fatality Response Oper-
ational Capabilities, measured with a 21-item checklist
developed with input from field experts and sample state,
and national guides [14,15,20,27,28]; and (c) Pre-existing
Resource Networks, measured with a new 12-item check-
list of jurisdictional and community resource partners.
Additional MFI planning
Seven items helped to further characterize MFI plan-
ning, including: (a) an office-specific MFI plan and fre-
quency of updating the plan; (b) the plan’s compliance
with the National Incident Management System (NIMS)
and with the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG)
[36,37]; (c) the jurisdictional role for ME/C during MFI;
(d) interoperability and mutual aide agreements; (e) writ-
ten policies on public communication during MFI; (f) use
of social media during MFI; and (g) provision of mental
health/spiritual counseling to staff and/or volunteers dur-
ing and after MFI.
Staff willingness and ability to report to duty, with and
without contamination with CBRNE agents
This was assessed using a two-part item based on some
of our earlier studies on ability (i.e., availability) and will-
ingness of staff to report to duty [31-34]. For these
items, respondents were asked to indicate the proportion
of staff that they thought would be willing and/or able to
report to duty during MFI, with or without CBRNE as
follows: (a) proportion of staff who they thought would
be willing to report in their roles during a mass fatality
incident; (b) proportion of staff who they thought would
be willing to report in their roles during a mass fatality
incident that involved CBRNE contaminants; (c) propor-
tion of staff who they thought would be able to report in
their roles during a mass fatality incident; (d) proportion
of staff who they thought would be able to report intheir roles during a mass fatality incident that involved
CBRNE contaminants. Additional items were included
on the preparation of a staff roster and staff pre-event
planning in order to determine the availability of staff
during MFI.
Training of staff and participation in drills
Three items addressed training, including training of
staff on the office’s mass fatality plan, training of staff on
MFI involving CBRNE agents, and training of the office
through participation in jurisdictional drills.
Self-reported workplace and jurisdictional preparedness
Measured by two items on respondents’ perceptions of
the preparedness levels of (a) their office, and (b) their
local jurisdiction.
Resource needs
One final item asked respondents to indicate from a list of
seven resources (plus an additional open ended “other” re-
sponse category) the resources they thought they needed
to help improve their office’s MFI preparedness and re-
sponse. The list included such items as “more training”,
“more planning activities”, “more funding for preparation
activities”, “more interagency agreements”, etc.
As noted, a copy of the study questionnaire and code-
book are appended.
Data analysis
After checks for internal reliability and validity of responses
and other data editing procedures were completed, an
array of descriptive statistics and graphical techniques (e.g.,
frequencies, histograms, measures of central tendency and
dispersion) were performed to characterize the distribution
of variables and to determine if there were any outliers.
This strategy provided familiarity with the data and allowed
us to determine if the data met assumptions required by
the intended statistical testing procedures. All analyses
were conducted using R (version 3.1.0, Auckland, New
Zealand) [38].
The main outcome (criterion) variables were the three
measures of MFI preparedness. To determine the rela-
tionship between the three measures, Pearson's product-
moment correlation coefficient, r, was used to measure
the degree of linear association between each of the vari-
ables, with results ranging from r = .49 - .64, indicating
generally moderate to strong correlations. After careful
examination of the frequency distribution of the three
outcome variables, each outcome measure was dichoto-
mized into two categories (scores below the median = 0;
equal or above the median = 1). This was appropriate
given that the data were bimodally distributed (to in-
clude zeros) and because these were categorical and not
continuous variables. The dichotomization also allowed
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aged across Federal Regions. This also facilitated visual
comparison with the number of Presidential Disaster
Declarations, 2001-2014, also averaged across Federal
Region [39]. The maps as depicted were created using
ArcGIS 10.2.2 for Desktop (Redlands, CA) [40].
To explore the organizational factors associated with
preparedness, we first performed chi - squared statistics
and estimated odds ratios and their confidence intervals
using bivariate logistic regression analysis between each
predictor and outcome measure in order to provide
insight into the non-adjusted relations between predic-
tors and outcomes. The next stage in our analysis in-
volved logistic multivariable analysis to determine the
unique relationship between the outcome variables (pre-
paredness measures) and each predictor variable when
considering all variables simultaneously. Linear regres-
sion was not used as the preparedness variables were, as
noted, categorical and not continuous variables. For all
regression analyses, the level of significance was set at
5%. Results are presented as estimated odds ratio (OR)
and their 95% confidence interval (95% CI).
Results
Organizational characteristics
A total of 122 completed questionnaires were collected.
The actual response rate cannot be calculated, as this
was a convenience sample. However, the number of ME/
C in the US is approximately 900-1,000 [9], based on the
most recent (2004) available data. The mapped distribu-
tion of responses by US states and territories is shown in
Figure 1. The sample represented each of the 10 Federal
Regions and 37 of the 56 states and territories [41]. MostFigure 1 Distribution of ME/C respondents in US. Federal Regions were
using black lines. State and zip code data were used from the questionnairof the respondents were either Medical Examiners (48%)
or Coroners (44%), with the remainder indicating an-
other role, including Forensic Pathologist (2%), Sheriff
(2%), Justice of the Peace (1%), and “other” (3%). The
majority of respondents (49%) indicated that their office
served large jurisdictions (≥500 K people), followed by
25% serving 100 K-499.9 K, 14% serving 50 K-99.9 K, 8%
serving 25 K-49.9 K, and 4% serving small jurisdictions
with populations below 25 K. On average, most agencies
(52%) employed ≤10 full time employees, with only 9%
indicating ≥ 100 employees.
MFI preparedness and additional MFI planning
MFI plan elements
Frequencies for the MFI Plan checklist items are shown
in Table 1. A large majority of respondents (95%) re-
ported that their office had a written mass fatality plan,
but only 9% of the sample reported having all 19 items
on the MFI Plan Elements Checklist included in their
plan; on average, respondents reported having 68% of
the plan elements in their own plans (checklist mean =
12 [SD = 6.2], median = 13, min = 0, max = 19). The most
common plan items reportedly in place were: morgue
services; human remains recovery; and command and
control. The least frequently noted plan items included:
job action sheets for the various positions in the plan;
funding reimbursement policies; and availability of staff
respite areas.
Respondents reported that their local ME/C office’s
plan was updated annually (32%), every two years (22%),
or every five years (13%), with only 3% reporting that it
was never updated; a sizeable proportion (30%) were un-
sure or unaware of how often the plan was updated. Acolored differently and the states within each region were separated
e to determine the location of each ME/C respondent (red dots).
Table 1 Mass fatality plan frequencies (N = 114)
n (%)a
Morgue services 101 (88.6)
Human remains recovery 96 (84.2)
Command and control 94 (82.5)
Security and preservation of the remains 92 (80.7)
Incident notification and plan activation 85 (74.6)
Authorities 81 (71.1)
Family assistance 81 (71.1)
Concept of operations 80 (70.2)
Security and preservation of the disaster site 79 (69.3)
Application and scope 75 (65.8)
Continuity of operations plan 73 (64.0)
Religious/cultural considerations
(e.g., disaster emotional and spiritual care)
67 (58.8)
Mass fatality information systems 65 (57.0)






Job action sheets for the various
positions in the plan
49 (43.0)
Staff respite area 37 (32.5)
Funding reimbursement 33 (29.0)
aData shown represent individuals who endorsed each item on the checklist.
Table 2 Operational capabilities frequencies (N = 117)
n (%)a
Refrigerated storage of remains 94 (80.3)
Decedent recovery 89 (76.1)
Postmortem examination/morgue operations 89 (76.1)
Transport of remains 89 (76.1)
Decedent release/final disposition 82 (70.1)
Command and control for fatality management 81 (69.2)
Security and preservation of human remains 80 (68.4)
Ante-mortem data collection 74 (63.3)
Tracking system (i.e., victim identification
Program) for recovered remains
69 (59.0)
Joint agency death investigation 67 (57.3)
Decedent manifest 59 (50.4)
Information technology/tracking 52 (44.4)
Morgue operations for contaminated
(hazard material) human remains
50 (42.7)
Public messaging 46 (39.3)
Incident characterizations 42 (35.9)
Security and preservation of disaster site 42 (35.9)
Caring for or interring human remains
in accordance to the religious ritual or
requirements of most faith traditions
37 (31.6)
Missing persons call centers 28 (23.9)
Communication via social media 26 (22.2)
Temporary interment 21 (18.0)
Long term family management/memorial 10 (8.6)
aData shown represent individuals who endorsed each item on the checklist.
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compliant with NIMS [36]. However, only 40% reported
that their plan was compliant with the FEMA CPG [37].
Engagement at the local level was adequate; a large per-
centage (77%) reported that their office had a seat at
their local jurisdiction’s Emergency Operations Center
during MFI, and an even greater proportion (88%) had a
defined position during MFI. Most respondents (78%)
had interoperability and mutual aide agreements in
place. A large percentage (75%) of respondents reported
having written policies that addressed public communi-
cations/public announcements during MFI, but only
29% had written policies related to the use of social
media during MFI. Less than half (48%) of the respon-
dents had plans in place that addressed the provision of
mental health care or spiritual counseling for their staff
and/or volunteers during or after MFI.
Operational capabilities
Only 9% of respondents reported all 21 Operational
Capability Checklist items (mean = 10 [SD = 5.9], median =
11, min = 0, max = 21); on average, respondents reported
having 52% of the operational capabilities in place. The
most frequently reported operational capabilities formanaging MFI included: refrigerated storage of remains,
postmortem examination/morgue operations and trans-
port of remains. The least frequently cited capabilities
included: long term family management (i.e., memorial
services), availability of temporary interment facilities,
and communication system in place using social media.
See Table 2 for a complete list of the frequencies for
this checklist.
Pre-existing resource networks
The frequencies for the items on the Pre-existing Re-
source Networks checklist are shown in Table 3. Only
8% of respondents reported having relationships with all
12 potential sources of resources needed to respond to
MFI. The median checklist score for this measure was
8.5 (mean = 8 [SD = 3.3], min = 0, max = 12); on average,
the sample had more than 70% of the potential pre-
existing relationships in place. The most frequently re-
ported pre-existing partnerships in place were with local
organizations and agencies, such as local office of emer-
gency management, local members of the death care
sector (organizations affiliated with the funeral industry),
Table 3 Pre-existing resource networks frequencies
(N = 118)
n (%)a
Local Office of Emergency Management/Civil Defense 99 (83.9)
Local funeral homes, cemeteries, crematories 97 (82.2)
Local first response organizations 95 (80.5)
Local/State Department of Health 92 (78.0)
State Office of Emergency Management/Civil Defense 88 (74.6)
Federal assets 85 (72.0)
Voluntary organizations 79 (67.0)
Local health care organizations 78 (66.1)
Other nearby Coroner/Sheriff’s office/Justice of the Peace 74 (62.7)
Other nearby office of medical examiner 65 (55.1)
Faith-based organizations 51 (43.2)
Disaster management vendors/contractors 47 (39.8)
Other 4 (3.4)
aData shown represent individuals who endorsed each item on the checklist.
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portion (72%) also reported that they planned to rely on
federal assets. Most respondents (75%) reported that
their jurisdictional partners had their own mass fatality
plan, but less than 30% had signed off on those plans.
Typically, the response partners that the ME/Cs ex-
pected to assist them in MFI were the same ones that
they, in turn, would plan to help.
Graphic comparison of the three preparedness measures
A graphic comparison of the three measures and total
Federal Regional Presidential Disaster Declarations from
2001-2014, by Federal Region, is provided in Figure 2(A,B,
C,D). As noted, we have stratified the preparedness scores
for each of the three measures into two categories (below
the median and equal or above the median) across each of
the Federal Regions [41]. As can be seen, scores vary
across the three measures, as shown in 2(A-C). For ex-
ample, only Region 4, which includes Alabama, Florida,
Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Tennessee; Region 9, which includes
Arizona, California, Hawaii, Nevada, and the Pacific
Islands; and Region 10, which includes Arkansas, Idaho,
Oregon and Washington, had uniformly higher scores on
all three preparedness measures.
Other findings of interest relate to visual comparisons
with the map depicting the Presidential Disaster Declara-
tions (2001-2014), by Federal Region. Between 2001 and
2014, there were 1,740 declarations made in the US [39].
The total number of Disaster Declarations by Federal
Region has been categorized into two groups: < the me-
dian and ≥ the median number of reported declarations,
per Federal Region) over the time period of 2001-2014. Ascan be seen in Figure 2(D), the levels of preparedness
within each Federal Region are at the same level or
higher than the median number of declared disasters
in all regions except for Region 6 (Texas, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Louisiana), and Region 8
(Utah, Colorado, Wyoming, Montana, South Dakota
and North Dakota) [41].
Prior mass fatality incident experience and the number of
additional fatalities within a 48-hour period that would
exceed capacity
A majority (82%) of respondents reported that their jur-
isdiction had not experienced MFI in the past 5 years. A
sizeable proportion (42%) of the respondents reported
that their capacity would be exceeded by the addition of
24 or less fatalities (over and beyond their normal case
load) over a 48-hour time period. Additional fatalities
that would exceed capacity responses were as follows:
25-50 additional fatalities (28%), 51-75 additional fatal-
ities (10%); 76-100 additional fatalities (4%), and 13%
of respondents reported that they had the capacity to
manage an additional 100 fatalities or more in a 48-
hour period.
Staff willingness, ability to report to duty, with and
without contamination with CBRNE agents
A large majority (83% and 72%) of respondents indicated
that 80% or more of their staff would be willing and
able, respectively, to report to duty during a mass fatality
incident. However, substantially lower proportions (46%
and 52%) reported that 80% or more of their staff would
be willing and able, respectively, if MFI involved CBRNE
agents. Nearly one quarter of the respondents reported
that they expected less than 20% of their staff to report
if CBRNE agents were involved in MFI. Furthermore,
whereas staff rosters had generally been prepared to in-
dicate staff availability, less than half of the respondents
thought that staff had made pre-event plans (e.g., plans
to address childcare and elder care responsibilities) that
would ensure their availability to work during MFI. Re-
sults of chi-squared analyses indicated significant posi-
tive relations between training of staff and staff
availability (p < .01) and between staff participation in
drills and willingness to report to duty (p < .01), suggest-
ing that training may help support adequate staffing.
Training of staff and participation in drills
More than 70% of respondents indicated that their office
provided training to staff on the mass fatality plan, and
staff participation in drills with local partners was com-
mon (79%). However, CBRNE–related MFI training was
much more limited; only 27% of the respondents re-
ported that their office had ever provided this type of
specialized training.
Figure 2 Comparisons between preparedness measures scores and with respect to the Presidential Disaster Declarations. (A) MFI Plan
measure by Federal Region; (B) Operational Capabilities measure by Federal Region; (C) Pre-existing Resource Networks measure by Federal
Region; and (D) Presidential Disaster Declarations (2001-2014) by Federal Region. Data for the disaster declarations map were available at the
FEMA website [27] and median number of regional disaster declarations (N = 138) was used to categorize all 10 regions in map D. Maps A-C were
created using questionnaire data. Scores for the preparedness measures and number of disaster declarations were categorized into two groups
(below median and equal to or above median). The lighter blue represents regions with scores/number of disaster declarations below the median
and the darker blue indicates regions with scores/number of disaster declarations equal to or above the median.
Table 4 Resources needed to improve MFI preparedness
and response (N = 120)
n (%)a
Additional training of staff 89 (74.2)
Greater surge capacity (identification
of additional staff, supplies, space)
78 (65.0)
Additional funding for mass fatality planning 77 (64.2)
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Less than half (43%) of the sample thought that their office
was well prepared to manage MFI, 16% thought that they
were not at all or slightly prepared, and the reminder
(41%) thought they were moderately prepared. Similarly,
more than half (55%) of the respondents thought their jur-
isdiction was well prepared, 10% thought that their juris-
diction was not at all or slightly prepared, and the rest
(35%) thought they were moderately prepared.Additional mass fatality planning activities 71 (59.2)
Additional drills with other response partners 70 (58.3)
Signed interagency agreements 51 (42.5)
Other (e.g., better communications,
CBRNE trainings, better coordination, etc.)
19 (15.8)
A written mass fatality plan 15 (12.5)
ME/C office does not need any additional
resources to be better prepared
5 (4.2)
aData shown represent individuals who endorsed each item on the checklist.Resources needed to help improve MFI preparedness
and response
Only 5 (4%) respondents indicated that their office did
not need any additional resources to improve their pre-
paredness. The resources most frequently needed included
more training for staff, greater surge capacity, and more
funding for mass fatality planning. Detailed results may be
found in Table 4.
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predictor variables
As noted in Table 5, several factors were significantly as-
sociated with each of the measures of preparedness, but
only one variable, training of staff on the office’s MFI
plan, was significantly associated with all three. Training
of staff was also the single most strongly associated vari-
able with respect to the MFI Plan measure (OR = 5.44,
95% CI [2.10, 14.11]); i.e., ME/Cs who provided staff
training on the mass fatality plan had a 5.44 greater odds
of a higher score compared to those ME/C reporting no
staff training. Similarly, staff training was also positively
associated with the Operational Capabilities and Pre-
existing Resource Networks measures (OR = 3.86, 95%
CI [1.58, 9.46] and OR = 2.86, 95% CI [1.19, 6.84]), re-
spectively. For the Operational Capabilities measure, the
strongest association was noted for maximum fatalities
that could be handled within 48 hours (OR = 5.65, 95%
CI [2.52, 12.66]); ME/C reporting that they could handle
25 or more fatalities within 48 hours had a 5.65 greater
odds of having a higher score on the Operational Cap-
abilities measure than those who could handle 24 or less
within 48 hours.
Prior experience managing MFI was significantly asso-
ciated with higher scores on the Operational Capabilities
checklist (OR = 3.54, 95% CI [1.20,10.41]). Self-reported
perceptions of organizational preparedness were strongly
(positively) associated with both the MFI Plan and the
Operational Capabilities measures, as noted in Table 5,
indicating that respondents had perceptions that
reflected at least their own actual level of readiness as
measured by these two preparedness measures, although
we have no information on the actual readiness at the
jurisdictional level.
Findings of interest include the general lack of a sig-
nificant relation between preparedness measures and the
size of jurisdiction served, although the Operational
Capabilities measure was significantly (positively) associ-
ated with a larger workforce (>6 full time employees).
Relations between preparedness measures and
willingness and ability of staff to report to duty
Conceptually, willingness and ability of staff is seen as
resulting from preparedness of the worksite. That is, the
more prepared the workplace, the more willing and able
the work force will be to report to duty during disaster
events, including MFI. However, since these data are
cross-sectional, directionality for any of these study vari-
ables cannot be ascertained. To assess the relationship
between the willingness and ability variables and the
three preparedness measures we included them, as
shown in Table 5, in the bivariate analyses. The pre-
paredness measures, for the most part, were not signifi-
cantly associated with staff willingness and ability toreport to duty during MFI, with or without contamin-
ation with CBRNE. One exception here was the moder-
ate positive association between staff willingness to
report to non-contaminated MFI and (higher) MFI Plan
measure score (OR = 2.94, 95% CI [1.04, 8.32]).
Results of the multivariate analysis
Most variables significant at the bivariate level were no
longer significant at the multivariate level. Exceptions in-
cluded the MFI Plan measure and Operational Capabil-
ities measure, which remained significantly correlated to
each other (OR = 3.44, 95% CI [1.27,9.32], p < .05); ME/
Cs reporting highly developed plans were more than
three times more likely to report a high level of
organizational capabilities. Another significant result at
both the bivariate and multivariate levels was that Coro-
ners (as compared to Medical Examiners) were more
likely to report a higher score on the Pre-Existing Re-
source Network measures (OR = 3.5, 95% CI {1.46,8.40,
p < .01]. A borderline significant score was also noted
between the MFI Plan measure and training on the MFI
Plan.
Discussion
Based on our results, the three new preparedness mea-
sures presented in this paper provide for a broad and in-
clusive perspective on mass fatality management
preparedness. The MFI Plan measure serves as a road
map for planning, the Operational Capabilities allows for
an in-depth assessment of organizational resources and
Pre-existing Resource Networks indicates the external
supports available to the ME/Cs. These three measures,
when combined, reflect a more accurate level of local
ME/C preparedness to manage MFI. A fourth compo-
nent, ability and willingness of staff can also be consid-
ered an important indicator of preparedness, but we
conceptualize this as an outcome of preparedness (i.e.,
staff who perceive a more prepared workplace will be
more willing to show up for work during times of disas-
ter), rather than a predictor of preparedness. The nature
of the willingness and preparedness relationship has
been clearly demonstrated in real time during the Ebola
virus outbreak, where well prepared biocontainment
hospitals have reported a large increase in job applicants
willing to work in these high containment facilities in
contrast with hospitals treating cases or suspected cases
without this degree of preparedness reporting job ac-
tions and strikes [42,43].
The results of the bivariate analysis indicate the im-
portant relationship between high quality planning and
training; since these data are cross sectional, the exact
nature of the relationship for instance, between mea-
sures of preparedness and training, cannot be deter-
mined. However, it does seem likely that ME/Cs with














Workplace category (coroner is
the reference category)
1.03 .934 1.03 9.34 0.34 .006**
[0.42-2.17] [0.49-2.17] [0.16-0.74]
Number of full time employees
(6 or less is the reference category)
1.77 .129 2.52 0.16* 0.78 .500
[0.85-3.72] [1.19-5.34] [0.37-1.62]
Maximum fatalities that can be
handled within 48 hrs (24 or less
is the reference category)




Having experience of mass fatality
incidents in the past 5 years
(no is the reference category)
2.23 .135 3.54 .022* 1.12 .810
[0.79-5.71] [1.20-10.41] [0.44-2.88]
Training on mass fatality plan




3.86 .003** 2.86 .018
[2.10-14.11] [1.58-9.46] [1.19-6.84]
Training on CBRNE (no is the
reference category)
1.86 .155 2.17 .075 1.32 .510
[0.79-4.38] [0.92-5.12] [0.58-3.02]
Drills participation (no is the
reference category)
4.68 .005** 3.83 .003** 1.75 .250
[1.59-13.73] [1.58-9.46] [0.68-4.48]
Having staff roster (no is the
reference category)
1.83 .184 5.48 .001** 2.38 .061
[0.75-4.47] [1.99-15.14] [0.96-5.87]
Proportion of staff that are
willing to report to duty
during a regular mass fatality
incident (70% or less staff willing
is the reference category)
2.94 .042* 2.55 .068 2.25 .110
[1.04-8.32] [0.93-6.98] [0.82-6.13]
Proportion of staff that are willing
to report to duty during a CBRNE
involved mass fatality incident
(70% or less staff willing is the
reference category)
1.88 .177 1.87 1.27 1.10 .820
[0.85-4.13] [0.84-4.17] [0.50-2.39]
Proportion of staff that are able to
report to duty during a mass fatality
incident (70% or less staff able is
the reference category)
1.53 .313 2.24 .058 1.28 .550
[0.67-3.49] [0.97-5.15] [0.56-2.91]
Proportion of staff that are able to report
to duty during a CBRNE involved mass
fatality incident (70% or less staff able is
the reference category)
1.27 .552 1.15 .730 0.92 .830
[0.58-2.76] [0.52-2.52] [0.42-2.00]
Proportion of staff that have pre-event
plan (70% or less staff able is the
reference category)
1.15 .762 1.77 .224 2.34 .072
[0.47-2.80] [0.70-4.46] [0.93-5.89]
Self-reported workplace preparedness
(Less prepared is the reference category)





(Less prepared is the reference category)
2.35 .025* 2.69 .010* 1.35 .420
[1.12-4.95] [1.27-5.70] [0.65-2.81]
Serving urban area (less than
50,000 is the reference category)
2.14 .199 1.65 .386 0.55 .300
[0.67-6.81] [0.53-5.07] [0.17-1.74]
MFI plan elements (below median
is the reference category)
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Table 5 Bivariate regression analysis of preparedness measures and organizational (Continued)
Operational capabilities
(below median is the
reference category)
- - 2.22 0.31*
[1.01-4.59]
Pre-existing resource networks
(below median is the
reference category)
- -
Note. All organizational characteristics and preparedness measures were coded into binary variables.
*p < 0.05. **p < 0.01. ***p < 0.001.
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training programs based on their planning. For the most
part, factors that were significant in the bivariate ana-
lyses were no longer significant in the multivariable ana-
lysis, probably due to collinearity. More complex study
designs and the inclusion of other variables not studied
here, such as the funding available for MFI planning at
the jurisdictional level and MFI training and knowledge
of the ME/C, are needed in order to better characterize
the factors related to preparedness.
Our three-tiered approach to measuring preparedness
contrasts with other models for systems-level prepared-
ness, which have been suggested, such as the Ready,
Willing, and Able framework developed by McCabe and
colleagues [44]. Our approach incorporates many of
their constructs, especially “Ability”, which is reflected in
our operational capabilities measure. In our efforts to
characterize preparedness, we examined other metrics
considered by field experts to be essential components,
such as resources available to the ME/C through pre-
existing relationships and agreements- as these are vital
to effective MFI management. Additionally, in line with
systems-level preparedness models, our approach also
acknowledges “willingness” as noted above as an import-
ant component of preparedness. Compared to other sec-
tors we have studied with respect to willingness, the
ME/C are reportedly very willing to report to duty [31,32].
Still, and in consideration of the fact that ME/Cs and staff
are under a legal mandate to report to duty, a large pro-
portion of staff may fail to report-especially if CBRNE
agents are involved. Importantly, even if staff are willing,
their availability may be severely limited during an infec-
tious disease outbreak causing staff illness; meeting surge
capacity needs for staffing could then be highly problem-
atic, as replacement staff most likely would not have the
unique skill set required of ME/C and staff.
Our findings indicate variable levels of preparedness
using three separate, yet related measures of prepared-
ness. While improvements are indicated in all aspects of
preparedness, special attention is needed to address op-
erational capabilities since, on average, respondents had
only about half of the items on the Operational Capabil-
ities Checklist in place. Without these core capabilities,
response will be limited.With respect to the map of Presidential Disaster Dec-
larations comparing the median scores of the three pre-
paredness measures, while there are some differences, it
is important to acknowledge that not all disasters result
in high fatalities; a good example of this was Super
Storm Sandy, which, while causing an estimated $50B in
damages, resulted in relatively few direct deaths (N =
147) given the magnitude of the disaster [45].
Some notable findings in our study include the fact that
preparedness levels did not differ based on type of office
(i.e., Medical Examiner vs Coroner), jurisdictional charac-
teristics (size of population and rural vs urban), or the
number of staff. These findings indicate that preparedness
may not be simply a function of organizational character-
istics, but potentially influenced by some other factor(s). It
was also notable and reassuring to find that there was a
high degree of inter-organizational planning in place, as
this strengthens individual ME/C capabilities. As noted,
our results also point towards the need for special atten-
tion for certain aspects of preparedness, such as the use of
social media to help communicate with the public, and
mobilizing missing person’s hotlines. Social media is in-
creasingly being used by the public during and in the im-
mediate aftermath of disasters to help them connect to
family, friends, resources and timely information [46,47].
There was a gap noted in terms of providing mental
health assistance to staff and volunteers and the provision
of long-term family assistance, which may be particularly
important in the wake of MFI [48]. There are a number of
excellent information resources on the provision of mental
health and spiritual care, such as the Interfaith Network of
trained religious and lay leaders who are available for both
planning and response purposes [49]. We noted that many
respondents intended to call upon their local death care
sector colleagues for instrumental support and they may
also be able to play a role in terms of family assistance and
staff respite centers.
Results from this study indicate that, in some jurisdic-
tions, local ME/Cs are well equipped, staffed and pre-
pared to respond to MFI, while in other jurisdictions,
they might be overwhelmed by any additional fatalities
beyond their typical case load. Complex situations in-
volving CBRNE would challenge almost all ME/Cs. The
recent outbreaks of infectious diseases such as Middle
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and recent influenza pandemics, as well as a number of
industrial and transportation incidents involving hazard-
ous chemicals underscore the need for preparedness for
these types of incidents [3,50]. ME/Cs must look to their
local office of emergency management and their local
health departments for advice on what types of training
and preparedness activities are feasible and meaningful.
At the very least, local ME/Cs should know the agency
or persons to contact for expert advice if there they ever
have to respond to a CBRNE incident.
The findings here are in agreement with both the first
(2012) and the second (2013) National Preparedness Re-
ports; these serve as the nation’s report card for docu-
menting progress in building, sustaining, and delivering
the 31 core capabilities as outlined in the National Pre-
paredness Goal [13,51,52]. The 2012, 2013 and the most
recent 2014 reports highlighted the need for improve-
ments in mass fatality preparedness [13,51,53]. Planning
for MFI has been historically subpar; FEMA reported
that between 2006 and 2011, only 24 out of 56 states
and territories invested Department of Homeland Secur-
ity grant funds for fatality management activities, and fa-
tality management services were rated as the weakest of
all 31 core response mission capabilities [13]. Since we
merged our findings and presented them by Federal
Region, state level differences are not easily observed.
However, at the regional level we can ascertain wide dif-
ferences across the nation. These geographical differ-
ences may reflect the variable levels of investment in
mass fatality planning across states. In the 2013 national
review of state’s fatality management plans, it was noted
that while most states had established fatality management
plans, upon review some were inadequate or not action-
able [13]. This observation is consistent with our findings
at the local ME/C level, which showed that while individ-
ual ME/Cs reported the existence of plans, there was a
lack of completeness, as assessed by our new measures.
Furthermore, more than half of the states do not expect to
be able to build additional capacity and therefore intend
to rely on federal assets to close existing gaps [13]. Notable
exceptions to this include outstanding progress made in
certain jurisdictions including New York City, Harris
County Texas, Florida, Alabama, Ohio and several others
[13], which may serve as models for states struggling to
develop adequate capacity. Increased efforts to improve
MFI preparedness have also been made through the out-
reach provided to dozens of jurisdictions by the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the formation of
Regional Catastrophic Planning Teams, such as the New
York, New Jersey, Connecticut and Pennsylvania team; the
FBI establishment of the Scientific Working Group in
Disaster Victim Identification and the availability of an in-
tegrated web-based Unified Victim Identification System,developed by the NYC Office of the Chief Medical Exam-
iner, and training programs developed and hosted by the
National Mass Fatalities Institute [13,54-56].
Recommendations
Although these data have important limitations, namely
that they were obtained using convenience sampling and
a cross-sectional design, these findings nevertheless rep-
resent the largest sample of ME/C to comprehensively
report on MFI preparedness and response capabilities.
Based on these results, a number of preliminary recom-
mendations are made.
1. MFI Plan templates, tailored to local jurisdictional
capabilities, should be made widely available through
appropriate channels, including the national
organizations representing the ME/C.
2. The Operational Capabilities Checklist that we have
developed may also be a useful tool that could be
made widely available. Dissemination of tools like
this checklist may help local ME/Cs develop high
quality planning. MFI plans, operational capabilities
and resource sharing agreements should be reviewed
by ME/Cs annually and updated as needed. The
development and upkeep of plans should be a
transparent process, and information should be
distributed effectively throughout the organization.
The fact that many respondents did not know how
often their plans were updated indicates that this is
not currently the reality for most ME/Cs. Contact
information, including chain of command (local and
state level) contacts should always be kept up-to-date.
3. Because training was associated with preparedness,
it would be helpful to have web-based training made
widely available to all ME/Cs to ensure that they are
trained effectively using up-to-date curricula, and
excellent resources for this, including programs
addressing CBRNE, are available [21,57-59]. Drills
were also important. The local jurisdiction office of
emergency management should take the lead in
organizing MFI drills so that all responding actors
can participate, including local death care industry
businesses, local first responders, representatives of
faith-based organizations, and others.
4. ME/C leadership should identify one or more
experienced “advisors” within each Federal Region
who can coach local ME/Cs through the most
important first steps in the immediate aftermath of
MFI and to help the local ME/C in forming the
appropriate questions to ask of response agencies.
Additionally, every ME/C must have ready access to
experts knowledgeable on the management of
fatalities that involve CBRNE agents, as very few
ME/C have the necessary resources to safety and
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hazardous agents.
5. Since it is clear that many local ME/Cs expect to be
provided with resources at the federal level, a dialog
between local, state and federal level responders
must develop and be ongoing.
6. Funding is needed at national, regional, and local
levels for MFI preparedness and for the
development and implementation of mass fatality
management best practices guidance.
7. Finally, study data should be reviewed by key
informants in order to triangulate the findings and
to ensure adequacy of these preliminary
recommendations.
Strengths and limitations
A major strength of this study is that this is, to our
knowledge, the first study to develop MFI preparedness
criteria to assess subjective preparedness, and the first to
assess national levels and correlates of preparedness.
The criteria were developed with the input of many
respected ME/Cs in the field, which strengthens the
measures and indicates a high level of professional inter-
est in improving MFI response capabilities.
The three measures (a combined total of 52 items) could
be made widely available for ME/Cs to rapidly conduct
self-assessments, taking no more than 10 minutes to
complete. The results might guide tailored quality im-
provement activities, such as inter-agency agreements
with local response partners. The measures could also be
used at local and regional drills to assess MFI prepared-
ness at the state and Federal Region level. Other countries
could adapt these measures to meet their own national re-
quirements. The measures could also be used as a post-
assessment of MFI response; in the aftermath of MFI, local
ME/C could conduct a self-evaluation of their response.
Data from these measures also provide support for on-
going national efforts to improve the quality and effective-
ness of MFI management capabilities.
There are also several potential study limitations. First,
with a cross-sectional design we cannot infer causality.
For example, we cannot determine if staff training leads to
higher levels of preparedness or if agencies with higher
levels of preparedness are more likely to have staff train-
ing. Nevertheless, these data do provide a good snapshot
of current preparedness among US ME/Cs, filling a gap in
the literature. Second, self-reported (and therefore subject-
ive) responses could lead to under- or overestimation of
actual preparedness. However, if self-reporting bias does
exist in the sample, our results are much more likely to
represent an exaggerated degree of preparedness than
might actually be the case, as ME/Cs with little or no pre-
paredness might have been discouraged from completing
the survey. Thus, we believe the preparedness gaps reportedhere represent the minimum of those found in the field, and
that actual gaps may be even more dramatic.
Finally, because only a relatively small sample of the na-
tion’s ME/Cs participated in this questionnaire, we there-
fore have the potential risk of response bias and lack of
representativeness. Our sample therefore may not reflect
the actual state of preparedness of the entire population of
ME/Cs in the US. Our small sample and potential re-
sponse bias of respondents may therefore lead to a lack of
generalizability. However, our findings are similar to the
very limited data presented in the 2012 and 2013 National
Preparedness Reports and are also consistent with the per-
spectives offered by national leaders with broad knowledge
of response capabilities in this sector [13,51]. Our study
also benefited from representation of every Federal Re-
gion. In the future, it would be helpful to conduct annual
surveys on preparedness of this key sector. A more
complete assessment of preparedness in this sector will
likely be achieved through more robust recruitment and
follow-up measures, larger samples, and prospective study
designs using multivariable approaches in order to ac-
count for potential confounding variables. Actual experi-
mental studies should also be conducted (preparedness
training vs. wait list control) to identify evidence based
training programs.
Conclusions
Current climatological, meteorological, social and political
trends point toward increased risk of disaster-related
events and the possibility of MFI. We can mitigate the risk
to some extent, but it is likely that MFI will continue.
Therefore, it is imperative that we take the necessary steps
to prepare for these as feasibly as possible. Even small pre-
paredness steps can increase the effectiveness of mass fa-
tality management, and this in turn can help support
recovery of affected communities. Effective mass fatality
management, which includes respectful, culturally sensi-
tive handling of human remains, expeditious identification
of the decedents, and rapid release of the remains to fam-
ily members for final disposition, can help support the re-
covery and resiliency of survivors and the rehabilitation of
communities. Effective MFI management shows both re-
spect for the dead as well as compassion for the bereaved
and is appropriately one of our nation’s priority goals for
preparedness.
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